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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 13-4656
__________
DEBRA WEISMAN; ALBERT M. WEISMAN,
Appellants
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES;
JENNIFER VELEZ, Esq., In her official capacity as Commissioner;
ANCORA PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL; ALLAN BOYER, Individually, and in his
official capacity as Director, Human Resources; ALFRED FILIPPINI, Individually, and
in his official capacity as Director, Human Resources
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-11-cv-01856)
District Judge: Honorable Joseph E. Irenas
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 24, 2014
BEFORE: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Filed: December 2, 2014)
__________
OPINION*
__________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
I.
*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Weisman is a registered nurse. She was employed as a charge nurse at Ancora
Psychiatric Hospital from 1998 until 2010. Weisman took a medical leave of absence
from Ancora in late September, 2008, due to a diagnosed panic disorder. In June of
2009, as her medical leave neared an end, Ancora officials notified Weisman that she
needed to secure her physician’s approval before returning to work. She would also have
to undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation by a psychiatrist. Although she was cleared for
duty by her doctor, Weisman was deemed unfit to return to work by the examining
psychiatrist. Ancora informed Weisman that she was suspended pending the termination
of her employment. Pursuant to New Jersey law, hospital officials also notified the New
Jersey Board of Nursing that Weisman’s privileges had been suspended. See N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 26:2H-12.2b(a)(1)(a). The hospital officially terminated her employment in
January of 2010 and Ancora also informed the Board of Nursing of Weisman’s
termination.
Weisman’s union appealed the termination and the parties proceeded to
arbitration. In August of 2010, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. The
terms were simple: Weisman agreed to waive all claims arising from her employment
with Ancora and in return, the hospital agreed to designate her departure as one based on
a “resignation in good standing” instead of the more punitive designation of “removal.”
An error on the final Notice of Disciplinary Action indicated that her resignation was
“not in good standing,” but this error was later corrected by the hospital. A month after
resigning from Ancora, Weisman interviewed at another hospital, Kennedy Memorial,
and she was offered a position there, conditioned on a satisfactory background check.
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Kennedy Memorial hired an investigatory firm, which in turn sent Ancora a
questionnaire, seeking a reference for Weisman. Ancora reported that Weisman had
resigned voluntarily from her position and that her job performance met Ancora’s
standards for patient care. However, in response to the question whether Ancora had ever
reported Weisman to a professional review board, Ancora responded that it had, attaching
copies of its letters to the New Jersey Board of Nursing. Kennedy Memorial
subsequently withdrew its offer of employment.
Weisman blamed Ancora for the withdrawal of Kennedy Memorial’s employment
offer, and filed an action against the hospital in the District Court under various federal
statutes, seeking back pay, damages, and injunctive relief. She also asked for equitable
relief from the District Court to address Ancora’s alleged failure to properly implement
the provisions of the settlement agreement. After the District Court denied motions to
dismiss, and discovery had concluded, both parties filed for summary judgment.
Weisman asked for partial summary judgment on her state-law breach of contract claim;
Ancora sought relief on all counts. The District Court denied Weisman’s motion and
granted summary judgment to Ancora on all counts. Weisman timely appealed and we
will affirm.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We exercise
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s grant of
summary judgment de novo and “view inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d
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243, 248 (3d Cir. 2010) quoting Bayer v. Monroe Cty. Children & Youth Servs., 577 F.3d
186, 192 (3d Cir. 2009). “Summary judgment is appropriate where the [c]ourt is satisfied
‘that there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330
(1986).
III.
As the District Court did, we begin our analysis with the parties’ settlement
agreement. There can be no dispute that the settlement agreement is a valid, bargainedfor exchange between Weisman and Ancora. The agreement originally noted that
Weisman’s penalty was one of “removal.” But, handwritten notations indicated Ancora’s
agreement to modify that penalty to a “resignation in good standing.” Weisman, for her
part, agreed to waive “all appeals, claims, demands, damages, causes of actions or suits,”
which she might bring against “the state, its employees, agents, or assigns arising out of
or relate to the subject matter of this disciplinary action . . . .” The gist of Weisman’s
case, before the District Court and on appeal, is her belief that by agreeing to characterize
her departure as a “resignation in good standing,” Ancora also agreed not to divulge its
negative reports to the Board of Nursing to any prospective future employer. Ancora
agreed to do nothing of the sort, and we find all of Weisman’s claims meritless.
A.
Weisman first argues that the District Court erroneously interpreted the provisions
of her settlement agreement with Ancora. Focusing on the Amended Final Notice of
Disciplinary Action (which mistakenly stated that Weisman’s resignation was “not” in
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good standing), Weisman argues that the District Court erred by construing Ancora’s
responsibilities solely to the correction of this error. Her larger point is that by agreeing
to change her departure designation to a resignation in good standing, Ancora agreed to
either rescind its negative reports to the Board of Nursing or to omit any reference to
those reports when queried by prospective employers. We reject Weisman’s contentions.
The District Court did not construe the settlement agreement as narrowly as
Weisman suggests. Ancora’s responsibility under the settlement agreement, as the
District Court correctly noted, was to record that Weisman resigned her position “in good
standing.” Ancora met that responsibility. In response to Kennedy Memorial’s
background investigation, Ancora indicated that Weisman voluntarily resigned her
employment with the hospital. Weisman’s argument that the initial error on her
termination notice was a breach of the settlement agreement is equally as unavailing.
While the error may have violated the terms of the agreement, the violation was not a
material one. As we see it, Ancora’s obligation under the settlement agreement was to
report to any interested future employer that Weisman resigned her employment “in good
standing” with the hospital. The fact that her initial termination notice mistakenly
indicated that she had not left in good standing is irrelevant because Ancora never sent
the flawed notice to any future employment prospect.
Further, nothing in the settlement reveals Ancora’s agreement to revoke its letters
to the Board of Nursing, or to omit reference to them upon any inquiry by a prospective
employer of Weisman. Nor could Ancora bargain away this statutory obligation. See
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2H-12.2b(a)(1)(a); N.J. Stat. Ann. 26:2H-12.2c(a)(2). Weisman
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additionally maintains that the parties actually agreed that the disclosure of Ancora’s
reports to the Board of Nursing would violate the settlement agreement and that the
District Court overlooked testimony in support of this contention. That is not so.
Weisman points to testimony of Ancora CEO Boyer in support of her claim. When asked
whether a negative reference by Ancora would be consistent with Weisman’s resignation
“in good standing,” CEO Boyer indicated that such a conclusion was “not in the
agreement.” Further, Boyer did not testify that the designation “in good standing” left
Weisman with a clean employment record, as she asserts on appeal. To the contrary,
Boyer never made such a pronouncement; indeed, he was never asked whether
Weisman’s resignation exempted the hospital from its statutory obligations.
Lastly, the record repudiates Weisman’s argument that the settlement agreement
was a contract of adhesion. There simply is no evidence that Weisman was confused or
dissatisfied with the agreement’s terms. Nor can we find any evidence of duress or fraud
that would lead us to a conclusion that the settlement negotiations were unfairly onesided.
B.
Next, Weisman argues that the District Court erred by dismissing her retaliation
claim. Weisman also maintains that the District Court abused its discretion by refusing to
rescind the agreement. We disagree on both points. As to the retaliation claim, which
Weisman brought under the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act, and the
First Amendment to the Constitution, we find those claims waived. The settlement
agreement specifically waives any claims brought by Weisman under the CEPA and 42
6

U.S.C. § 1983. Having previously found the agreement to be a valid one, we hold
Weisman to its terms.1
Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion by refusing to rescind the settlement
agreement. Weisman argues that the agreement should be rescinded because she was
unaware that Ancora had reported her to the Board of Nursing. We first note that a
“unilateral mistake of a fact unknown to the other party is not ordinarily grounds for
avoidance of a contract,” and that, in order to grant rescission in the case of a factual
mistake, “the mistake must have occurred notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable care
by the party making the mistake.” Intertech Assocs., Inc. v. City of Paterson, 604 A.2d
628, 632 (N. J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992). Here, we agree with the District Court that
Weisman presented no evidence to support her claim that she did not know that Ancora
had reported her to the Board of Nursing. Now, with the benefit of hindsight, Weisman
argues that she agreed to the “in good standing” designation but thought that by so doing,
Ancora would be obligated to rescind its letters to the Board of Nursing. She claims that
the hospital did not notify her that they had reported her to the Board of Nursing before
she signed the settlement agreement and that she would not have done so had she known
of the reports. The record, however, tells a different story. Weisman, in fact, signed a
Weisman also argues that even if the waiver provision is enforceable, Weisman’s
retaliation claim stemming from Ancora’s June 2010 disclosure of the reports to the
Board of Nursing is still viable because this claim arose after the Settlement Agreement
was signed, and the waiver provision only bars claims that accrued before the parties
entered the agreement. This claim is also without merit because it is predicated on the
incorrect assumption that such disclosure violated Ancora’s obligations under the
agreement. We have already decided that this disclosure did not violate the Settlement
Agreement and was, in fact, legally required. Any retaliation claim based on this
disclosure must fail.
1
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mail receipt on April 2, 2010, just two days after Ancora had sent her a letter enclosing
the two reports it had made to the Board of Nursing. Further, Weisman herself
acknowledged that she did indeed have notice of the hospital’s reports---she specifically
stated so in her complaint. Therefore, the District Court did not err by finding that
Weisman’s own failure to exercise reasonable care by reviewing her own mail precludes
rescission of the agreement.2
C.
Weisman also maintains that the District Court incorrectly resolved several issues
of material fact. We disagree and will briefly review Weisman’s arguments. To begin
with, Weisman argues that the District Court improperly resolved the question of when
she received notice that Ancora had reported her to the Board of Nursing. We have
already disposed of this argument. To be plain, the record specifically contradicts
Weisman’s position that she received no notice of Ancora’s reports before starting
arbitration. The District Court committed no error. Weisman points to further instances
where she believes the District Court improperly resolved issues of material fact. These
include her assertion that there was no “meeting of the minds” on essential terms of the
settlement agreement; that the District Court’s construction of the term “resignation in
good standing” is inconsistent with the intent of the parties; that Ancora’s disciplinary
actions against her lacked predicate facts; whether she truly was unfit for duty as
determined by Dr. Margolis, the examining psychiatrist; whether Dr. Margolis’ report
2

Our review of the record convinces us that any allegation of fraud made by Weisman
must fail as well. As the District Court correctly noted, the record reveals no allegations
of fraud, duress or any other imposition that might have negated the agreement.
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was based on accurate information; and whether Weisman undertook actions (leaving
voicemail messages, etc.) and whether those actions were inappropriate or disrespectful.
We reject all of these contentions.
First of all, these alleged “genuine issues of material fact” all transpired before the
creation of the settlement agreement on April 16, 2010. Since the District Court
concluded that Ancora had not breached the Settlement Agreement, the agreement’s
waiver proviso bars claims arising before April 16, 2010. Moreover, the District Court
did not base its opinion on these alleged factual disputes, but instead provided Weisman’s
counsel with generous opportunities to rebut Dr. Margolis’ evaluation of her fitness for
duty. The bottom line here is that the District Judge did not resolve disputed issues of
fact but instead relied on undisputed facts in resolving this case. These undisputed facts
included Weisman’s own admissions of her conduct; conduct which provided the basis
for Ancora’s report to the Board of Nursing. We, therefore, find no error on the part of
the District Court.
D.
Weisman lastly contends that the District Court erred by denying her motion for
partial summary judgment as moot. Specifically, she believes the District Court should
have granted her partial summary judgment on Ancora’s affirmative defense that New
Jersey law required them to report Weisman to the Board of Nursing. We see no error in
the District Court’s decision to deny her motion. Weisman’s argument on appeal suffers
from a lack of supporting evidence. She points to no evidence that Ancora could have
legally concealed its reports from the Board of Nursing or that they could have omitted
9

notifying Kennedy Memorial without violating New Jersey law. Indeed, Weisman
concedes this point.
In short, Weisman has not demonstrated an entitlement to summary judgment--partial or otherwise--- on her breach of contract claim or on Ancora’s affirmative defense
of statutory compliance.
IV.
In sum, and having considered all arguments raised by the Appellant, we find no
merit to them and will affirm the decision of the District Court.
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